This paper discusses one of the most significant challenges of next-generation big data (BD) federation platforms, namely, Hadoop access control. Privacy and security on a federation scale remain significant concerns among practitioners.
Hadoop's current primitive access control presents security concerns and limitations, such as the complexity of deployment and the consumption of resources.
However, this major concern has not been a subject of intensive study in the literature. This paper critically reviews and investigates these security limitations and provides a framework called BD federation access broker to address 8 main security limitations. This paper proposes the federated access control reference model (FACRM) to formalize the design of secure BD solutions within the Apache Hadoop stack. Furthermore, this paper discusses the implementation of the access broker and its usefulness for security breach detection and digital forensics investigations. The efficiency of the proposed access broker has not sustainably affected the performance overhead. The experimental results show only 1% of each 100 MB read/write operation in a WebHDFS. Overall, the findings of the paper pave the way for a wide range of revolutionary and state-of-the-art enhancements and future trends within Hadoop stack security and privacy.
for unifying user/application access to resources, services, and data. Moreover, Hadoops primitive configuration lacks any classification mechanism that improves metadata governance or facilitates auditing procedures. Therefore, formalizing the IAM features of Hadoop 3. x, in addition to emphasizing the complexity of securely utilizing their core functionality, is becoming a research interest. This trend serves as a form of knowledge capture by mapping current technologies of concern and formulating the latest Hadoop capabilities related to access control frameworks and audit log management. This paper highlights the need for robust access control that handles the authentication and authorization operations within a federation scale. The paper defines the associated requirements of secure BD runtime and management of the Hadoop HDFS federation. It therefore proposes a reference model (RM) that provides a basis for building an interoperable data federation scheme that includes all of the major stages and reflects specifics in access control within Hadoop clusters using modern open-source technologies. Furthermore, this paper explains how the proposed models can be implemented using modern BD infrastructure (BDI) to meet the increasing demand for scalable access controls and digital forensics (using access log analysis). The key question we will be asking to address the IAM challenge is as follows: How can we create a dynamic reference model that is compatible with the foreseen BDI scenarios in a federated setting? We address this question by employing the proposed RM in a novel access broker that provides a single sign-on environment. The proposed BD Federation (BDF) broker is an access control logic component to securely connect the external users with the Hadoop cluster gateway. The work presented in this paper may be employed in a Hadoop federation environment across multi-tenant BD clouds, as well as within on-premise data centres.
An essential application of the proposed solution deals with security auditing and analysis of audit logs of BD operations. These log files contain detailed information about all access call activities regarding BD processes and infrastructure to be protected by centralizing the access control of the data lake, BD services, and underlying resources in a unified access broker pattern. This 3 broker abstracts the identification, authentication, and authorization discussion within large-scale data analytics. This layer may also afford granular insights into pieces of information by performing security and risk assessment, tracking data pipeline audit logs, and examining behavioural analytics to meet their compliance and governance demands within the Hadoop 3. x platform.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Hadoop federation and its role in supporting BD operations. It also highlights complementary security measurements for BD frameworks and discusses the related work. The HDFS access control primitives and federation access provisioning limitations on which this study is based are investigated in Section 3. Section 4 describes the logic language for defining the RM, while we implement the proposed model in a novel access broker proof-of-concept framework in Section 5. Section 6 demonstrates the advantages of the proposed centralized audit log management, and we ultimately provide the conclusion in Section 7.
Hadoop Federation
As the size of a Hadoop cluster increases, the pressure on the NameNode and the ResourceManager increases. To alleviate this problem, Hadoop has introduced both HDFS Federation [6] and YARN Federation [7] . HDFS Federation consists of the usage of multiple independent NameNodes, where each NameNode is responsible for managing a subset of the whole namespace. To understand how this federated architecture works, we need to explain how the single HDFS is designed. HDFS is composed of two main layers:
• The namespace layer, which runs in the NameNode and is in charge of storing all information related to directories, files, and blocks (creation, deletion, modification, listing).
• The block storage service, which supports low level block-related operations and contains two parts: -Block management, which runs in the NameNode and is responsible for block creation, deletion, modification, replication, and location.
-Physical storage, which runs in the DataNodes and is responsible for storing the data blocks and providing read/write access to them.
Whereas physical storage can be easily scaled horizontally, simply by adding more DataNodes, previous versions of HDFS only allowed the namespace layer to be scaled vertically, as it runs on a single NameNode. The HDFS federation removes that limitation, allowing the namespace layer to be scaled horizontally.
It uses a federation of multiple NameNodes that are independent; i.e., they do not require coordination with each other. Each NameNode is assigned a set of blocks, which is called a block pool. Different blocks in a Block Pool can live in any DataNode, and so each DataNode must register with all NameNodes in the cluster, sending them periodic heartbeats and reports about block status.
A schema of this architecture is shown in Figure 1 .
However, on Jan 16, 2019, Apache Hadoop released its 3.2.0 stable platform, while the first stable 3.x line was released on Apr 6, 2018. This release incorporates several significant enhancements over the previous primary release line. A federated architecture has also been proposed for Apache YARN. This approach allows YARN to scale to tens of thousands of nodes. In this architecture, a large YARN cluster is split into a set of sub-clusters. Each sub-cluster has its own ResourceManager and compute nodes. From the point of view of applications, the federated cluster is still seen as a single huge YARN cluster, and tasks can be scheduled on any node of the cluster. The federation system is responsible for negotiating with the resource managers of the sub-clusters and providing resources to each application. YARN Federation functionality relies on reliable connectivity across sub-clusters to deploy atop the HDFS Federation. A federation architecture across data centres among several physical confines requires further investigation.
HDFS federation
In this section, we present a brief overview of HDFS federation architecture and highlight the Apache Hadoop security features.
HDFS architecture
HDFS [8] is a distributed and open-source file system designed to meet the rapidly growing demands of large-scale data management and access. The HDFS is composed of two primary daemons: (i) a single NameNode (NN) that is deployed at the cluster master node and (ii) several DataNodes (DNs) running at the cluster slaves (usually one per node). The NN runs the namespace process, which manages the file system information and regulates access to files using a conventional hierarchical organization. In addition, it tracks block locations and numbers and writes log information files for auditing purposes. Internally, a file is partitioned into multiple data blocks that are placed into various DNs to be stored in local disks (block storage). These blocks are replicated for fault tolerance over several DNs from different racks (if possible). The NN makes all decisions regarding replicas and periodically receives a static heartbeat; the default period is every 3 seconds. The NN checks the expiry time report of a heartbeat every 200 seconds (as a default timeout). When a new file is updated, the NN places replicas of the file blocks in different nodes and racks (if available).
Conventionally, the Hadoop cluster runs several DNs, but it has only one 6 NN (and one namespace) for all DNs (HDFS High-Availability allows running two NNs when working in active/standby mode). The DNs can be scaled both vertically (by adding more resources to the nodes) or horizontally (by adding more nodes to the cluster). The NN, however, may only scale vertically, which means that one needs to add more resources (CPUs and RAM) to that NN server to serve more DN metadata. Notice that metadata are preserved in memory for minimizing latency and enabling faster retrieval. This approach causes a single point of failure and, hence, limits the number of blocks, files, and directories maintained on the file system. The HDFS Federation has been introduced to cope with this issue.
To enable a universal block storage layer, Hadoop performed separation of namespace and blocked storage [9] . A federation BD environment, through multi-independent namespaces for block management and a common block pool for data storage, improves scalability and isolation of Hadoop operations. Therefore, by loosening the tightly coupled block storage and namespace, each DN registers with all the NNs in the cluster (this increases the authentication requirement). These DNs send periodic heartbeats, block reports and handle commands from the NNs. This allows horizontal scaling of the NN and enables the aggregation of geo-distributed Hadoop clusters. This feature directly enhances throughput by adding more access enforcers (typically, NNs in HDFS architecture), which improves read/write operations.
Moreover, the HDFS federation services high-intensity BD applications that block vast resources on the NN by distributing them among different namespaces. However, this imposes authentication and authorization challenges, as well as security concerns, which we address in the next section. For instance, a federation cluster may improve the query performance in a Hive framework -as Apache Hive manages data in partitions within different tables and locations.
This setting can store various tables in separate namespaces, or even save the table partitions in different namespaces. In principle, this optimizes load balancing across multiple namespaces (e.g., one for archival data and another for current data), which reduces each namespace load and improves the application isolation. • Access control is a service gateway to securely and efficiently communicate with the BD federation. This layer verifies the external client's access to the system using the user identification (ID) and passwords. Every client username and IP address must be in the host file or in a DNS table, and must match the client-given password. This process may also include Apache Knox [10] , a unified gateway framework for Hadoop services and ecosystem that can be utilized as a single-sign-on (SSO) gateway.
Complementary security measures for HDFS federation
• Authentication is the act of confirming authentication access to the Hadoop services and HDFS data (after user log-on to the cluster), i.e., the process of actually determining the client identity. In a non-secure Hadoop mode, this layer is disabled and internal entities, i.e., clients (confirmed by the host OS), application, and ecosystem, interact directly with the Hadoop services. However, Hadoop secure mode [11] enables an authentication mechanism to verify that an entity is what it claims to be using the Kerberos protocol (authentication based on tokens). Each Hadoop service and user must be authenticated by the Kerberos keytab file (binary containing the information needed to log) using Hadoop tokens to initialize trust between a client/application and the HDFS (more details in Section 3.3). Authentication for access to the Hadoop services web console requires enabling the HTTP SPNEGO protocol as a backend for Kerberos credentials [12] . Thus, preventing the stored data in HDFS from unauthorized access is applied both to all clients accessing the cluster and to any service claimed to be part of the cluster.
• Authorization is the process of defining access rights which an entity (service, daemon, or client) can perform to the given service. It manages access in the context of a specific service, resource, and data functionality provided by the cluster. Hadoop service level authorization (SLA) manages the fundamental set of permissions, such as defining the users and groups who are authorized to make service calls (e.g., data access) to that service. The call will pass the authorization check only if the user making the call belongs to an authorized service entity. It also provides fine-grain access control (table, column, and file levels) by enforcing the access control list (ACL), i.e., consistent policy administration across all Hadoop ecosystems [13] . ACL combines three elements: effect (allow or deny), action (e.g., data access or execution), and resources (e.g., NameNode1, Hive table). In principle, authorization is considered to be the final IAM layer in a Hadoop security abstraction, which means that no additional security mechanism is required as an IAM intention for an authorized client. Nevertheless, data encryption both at rest and in transition is still required, in addition to security analysis, auditing, and metadata governance, which represent high-level security services when combined as in Figure 2 .
• Data Governance is a capability that ensures adequate manageability of data through the complete lifecycle (i.e., data at rest, movement, and processing). This layer includes several dimensions, including classification (labeling and description), source tracking, and quality across data sources. Providing a typical store for exchanging metadata tags and attributes among the Hadoop stack can be achieved using Apache Atlas [14] and Apache Solr [15] for defining data types and fields using full-text indexing and querying techniques.
• Data Integrity and Confidentiality is a capability to ensure adequate consistency and accuracy of data-at-rest as well as in-transit. This security layer includes validity and recoverability approaches, as Hadoop 3. x utilizes erasure coding for fault tolerance [16] . However, aiming for confidentiality, HDFS implements end-to-end encryption with so-called transparent data encryption [17] . This HDFS encryption occurs at the file level of on-disk data and is stored as NN metadata. On the other hand, Hadoop wire-security (such as for data transfer between Web-console and client) is managed via SSL/TLS for HTTP communications.
• Security auditing and analysis: The aggregation of log files and reports provides a robust audit capability within different components of the Hadoop ecosystem. This layer may also afford granular insights into pieces of information by performing security and risk assessment, tracking data pipeline audit logs, and examining behavioural analytics to meet their compliance demands within Hadoop.
Related work
The security of BD deployment architectures and Hadoop service trust have always been labelled as research concerns. Several research papers have discussed the Hadoop ecosystem privacy and access management [18, 19, 20, 21, 10 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] . The access control requirements and privacy analysis of Hadoop frameworks have been addressed in the literature [5, 27] . Recently, Gupta et al. [18] and [19] Big data privacy issues are also well addressed, and novel solutions have been proposed in [27, 33, 34, 35] , in addition to an SSO framework for Hadoop services in [36] . Colombo et al. conducted a comprehensive study of big data technologies, including access control requirements, state-of-the-art and future trends, in [37, 5, 21] . One of the earliest works by Kulkarni [38] targets wide-column NoSQL databases which support content and context-based access control policies at different levels of the data model, such as row or column. Another work on Cassandra datastore [39] presents a cryptographic enforcement of RBAC [40] policies.
Access control of data and resources from multiple sources within centralized computing systems has been a subject of intensive studies in the literature.
Context-awareness using fuzzy logic conditions as access control approach has been proposed in [41] to address the dynamic outsourcing environment on the edge of the network, and for the intelligent transportation systems [42] . Aiming to protect the redundant data stored over the cloud, an approach by Zhou, Yukun et al. [43] supported flexible access control with revocation. Adopting a proxy re-encryption policy to update the process to the outsourced cloud was reported for BD deployments [44] to support ciphertext re-encryption.
Controlling access to sensitive BD, e.g., healthcare records, using the quantum mechanical equivalent of digital signature was introduced [45] , along with an unaddressed challenge of the data transfer process. Other than the implementations mentioned above, the BDs of time series (e.g., time-series databases) are required to be associated with an encrypted timestamp, the authors in [46] proposed an access and inference control model to enforce time and value-based constraints over the hierarchical time series data. Meanwhile, the analyzing of malicious codes and intrusion detection for cybersecurity and malware detection was reported [47, 48, 49, 50] Standardizing the security development schema of secure systems was first reported in [51] . This standardization unifies practices and languages for modelling security and access control among different implementers. A reference model for developing cloud applications was reported [52] , along with a survey that supports federated access control [53] . Researchers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [54] have presented a general access control model for BD processing frameworks which introduces the novel notion of chain of trust among entities to authorize access requests. Barker, S. proposed meta-model and best-practices of access control modelling [55] . Both the work of Barker and this research aim at unifying access control models by drafting a reference model. However, herein, we address the modern Hadoop 3.x status given the broad diversity of existent access control uniformity associated with a federation environment. Additionally, this paper distinguishes itself by addressing the HDFS federation access control challenges and maps cutting-edge frameworks to that problem domain.
Access control in HDFS
A client needs to perform tasks through the NN as a central policy enforcer for the HDFS. The NN receives the client call and allows it to reach data files which are stored in local disks via the DN pool. HDFS applications need a write-once-read-many access model for files. Once a file is created and written, it cannot be modified without an authorization access level policy. A secure IAM model must ensure that entities (clients, processes, and daemons) are who they claim to be (authentication) and that they have permissions to perform the requested operation (authorization). 
HDFS replica selection
It is important to direct the reader's attention to "how it works" before presenting the access challenges within the federation settings.
The HDFS cluster responds to client calls via the closest block replica to the reader node, aiming to keep data movement and read latency to a minimum.
Thus, the preferred replica is the one stored locally (if available) to the reader node or the replicas of the same rack to reduce bandwidth consumption (see Table 1 ). If the HDFS spans multiple rack clusters, then a replica placed in the local rack is preferred over any remote replica [56] . The NN manages this fault tolerance operation by implementing a rack-aware policy (e.g., the first replica is placed on the local node, the second is located in a different rack, and the third one is stored on another node within the local rack). By analysing the DN length to the parent, the NN selects the replica placement path. Consider the example in Table 1 that assists in the further discussion concerning HDFS access control and HDFS Federation (section 5). A Hadoop application will use blocks locally within its current node. However, if the block has to be copied from a remote DN, it will calculate and pass the block to the clients in the order of proximity. which had been set by the administrator, and the service call is either granted authorization to proceed with the operation or to deny it. Finally, the NN writes audit log information to a local file. System administrators must set this security mechanism for each Hadoop component and execution engine (Spark, Hive, HBase, etc.). Every ACL has one NN (and only one), while the NN could or could not have an ACL. In the last case, any service call made by the user that reaches the NN will gain access to DNs (the user still needs the ID and password for the external log).
Apache Hadoop federation access management
A cluster with high-level data analysis, i.e., sequel operations, and different execution engines will contact its security module (local policy authority or access enforcer) to validate access control rules. Figure 4 illustrates a Hadoop Yarn cluster with several data access requests managed by different BD execution frameworks. The cluster administrators need to separately create the ACLs by specifying authorization access based on the local policy authority (e.g., HDFS ACL, Hive ACL, etc.) for each framework [13] . The NN will perform a permission check before issuing any operation; those ACLs are located and defined in the $HADOOP CONF DIR/hadoop-policy.xml file. In this case, the request will reach the local authorization module that allows/denies the operation and writes its own logs to a local file. These individual access enforcers (see Figure 4 ), coupled to file permissions and different Hadoop framework orchestration, make it challenging and time-consuming to set a secure BD environment, not to mention the new BD federation features and multi-tenant BDaaS cloud deployment architecture. A solution relies on a cross-service authorization framework that provides a centralized policy authority to store and manage security policies for multiple ecosystem components.
Limitations of BD Federation access control
The broad participation nature of both clients and execution frameworks that are associated with the Hadoop federation warns against security concerns.
In addition to the complexity of settings, dynamically and elastically scaling client authorization and policy provisioning are challenging tasks. A central policy enforcer to manage the access discussions seems mandatory. This section outlines the inherited limitations of implementing HDFS access control in a federation setting.
Restricting access to the data stored in HDFS requires ensuring an accurate level of access by both clients and applications to the ecosystem components. In this way, by enabling Hadoop secure mode, every client, service, daemon, and process (which we refer to as entities) running within Hadoop must authenticate its membership of the cluster. The Hadoop underlying authentication service is based on Kerberos encapsulation, a leading local area network certificatebased protocol. Kerberos is a three-way protocol that requires every task to be authenticated before accessing the data. Therefore, only verified HDFS DN could register with the NN, and every task must be authenticated via the threeway handshake process before resource acquisition. This approach can cause performance degeneration in distributed clusters (e.g., think of a MapReduce application with thousands of tasks).
One solution to this problem is to complement Kerberos with Delegation
Tokens (DT), a lightweight authentication process. With DT, a client or application is first authenticated with Kerberos, and DT is then applied for sub-sequent and iterative service calls. Thus, the cluster services and daemons are only authenticated with Kerberos, while the client's subsequent service calls and job tasks will use the DT credentials to interact with the HDFS. The use of Kerberos and DT in secure HDFS federation authentication is described in for every block with which they must communicate.
2. The client uses the access ticket for subsequent service calls, instead of using Kerberos. Furthermore, the distributed tasks use that DT certificate on behalf of clients to securely reach the NN at runtime.
3. The client and the distributed tasks can access the HDFS DN using the granted access tickets, which declare that the caller has the stated access rights to the data blocks within the job submission.
A single-sign on (SSO) architecture can be managed using Kerberos with the lightweight directory access protocol (LDAP), which is enabled by setting Hadoop.security.group.mapping.ldap.url to true. Alternatively, implementing a single gateway that handles client access management behind a firewall can be achieved by employing Apache Knox. Knox will allow/deny users to access the ecosystem services before interacting with the Hadoop cluster.
Following user verification using the Knox gateway, Knox will use its Kerberos principals to securely confirm access with other Hadoop services and daemons.
Problem definition
The previous example demonstrates a single client contacting the NN, while several authentication mechanisms must be sequentially acquired for each Hadoop entity (daemon, client, and task). The DT ticketing process considerably decreases the amount of authentication requests; however, we argue that a federation Hadoop cluster can process the login requests of thousands of entities 2. Long-running services: Due to token expiration time, supporting longrunning jobs beyond the token maximum lifetime is a difficult task (e.g., aggregating logs) [57] . This involves a continual reauthentication process that requires cancelling all running tasks in order to start a new session.
The new features of Hadoop 3. x need to include an adaptive mechanism for each expired token to continue to support the long-lived YARN applications service [58] . process that must be configured carefully. This model might be acceptable for a relatively small setup, but not for a federation infrastructure.
Communication orchestration

Federation access control reference model
A service-oriented metamodel for access control support in BD federation platforms is presented in Figure 6 . The Federated Access Control Reference Model (FACRM) is a set of architecture components that are associated with the security development of BD environments. FACRM also addresses many technical aspects that optimize context-specific design, which need to be clari- can set the group mapping service [59] . However, resolving URL access via groups is managed via LDAP with simple authentication using JNDI-API. AuthorizationEnforcer: a process that enforces access decisions based on the CPA policies before allowing communication with its underlying services.
It represents the NN daemon (see Figure 3 ) in a native HDFS access control pattern. To generalize the IAM processes within different methodologies (i.e., only utilizing the Hadoop core capabilities or employing a third party), the presented metamodel separates this functionality. Every service call thus must pass through a predefined AuthorizationEnforcer before reaching the service.
AuthorizationAgents: a distributed representative component that belongs to the AuthorizationEnforcer. Each service daemon (DN, HBase table) has an AuthorizationAgent that approves the access call. The AuthorizationAgent could be an ACL or a Ranger policy agent. Service: the system processing framework, execution engines, and HDFS DNs. These services may include, but are not limited to: MapReduce for batch querying, Apache Spark for micro-batches, and Apache Storm for real-time processing. A comprehensive security ecosystem will require performing auditing measurements at the service level of BD applications and frameworks.
SecurityAuditing: tracks the service calls and status of requests, in addition to monitoring client activities. This service may include identifying security and performance issues within the local log files or employing the Apache Eagle framework. These services require security auditing to improve the overall security measurements.
SecurityAnalysis: carrying out a security assessment based on client behavioural analysis, incident reports, and audit pieces of information.
Admin: the one who sets the policy for other users of the system. The admin depends on the SecurityAnalysis and client demands to define the IAM policies. Admin is also responsible for securely installing/configuring the clus- ter entities, maintaining a secure operational environment, performing security patching policy, and scaling computing resources based on peak utilization.
Implementation and Validation
In general, BDF provides a systematic way to dynamically provision the user demands with elastic resources and services over shared data blocks. Implementing federated authorization and delegation to enhance BD client access decisions is vital for the success of adopting these new features of Hadoop 3. x.
In this paper, we argue that the FACRM is essential for the concept of unifying the IAM in a BDF infrastructure and the data that they stock. We demonstrate how the proposed components of BDF deployments can be brought to a secure access broker architectural pattern. This BDF access broker abstracts the identification, authentication, and authorization discussion within the largescale data analytics of the Hadoop 3. x platform. Furthermore, we explain the required steps to utilize the FACRM as a multi-tier Hadoop architecture within any deployment architecture. In general, the broker architectural pattern can be used to structure distributed systems with decoupled components that interact through remote service invocations. In this study, we present and demonstrate a pattern for this type of system, and we highlight its importance on the federation scale. Figure 7 shows 2. Ranger authorization assignment: the clientID is passed to Ranger to validate the access call to contact NNs, and a secure session is established.
Federation Access Broker
If successful, Ranger responds with a certificate for authorization level access and assigns the permissions of each NN (defined by the admin) to reach the stored data in the DNs which belong to that specific NN. 
Formal Access Control Model Components
We have formally defined the federation supported access control model in Table 2 . This model has been adapted from the object tagged RBAC model [19] for Hadoop, and introduces required components to demonstrate the federation. User Subject
• userSub : S→ U, mapping each subject to its creator user, where the subject acquires some or all of the permissions of the creator user.
Hadoop Service Access Operation Decision
A subject s ∈ S is allowed to perform an operation op ∈ OP HS on a service hs ∈ HS if the effective permissions of userSub(s) include permission assignments for hs ∈ HS.
Formally, (hs,op) ∈ effectiveHS prms (userSub(s)) in native Hadoop service authorization capabilities to restrict access to users.
As shown in the table, the Hadoop service permissions (HS-PRMS) are the power set of the cross products of HS and OP HS . A many to many relation PA HS specifies the assignment of Hadoop service permissions to the users or groups. In this way, a user can be assigned permission to access Namenodes in the system, either directly or through group membership (using the sufficient permissions effectiveHS prms ). For example, a user u1 may only be allowed to access Namenode namenode1, and then the permission assignment must be only for that tuple (u1,namenode1) in the PA HS relation.
A user creates a subject stated by the userSubfunction. The subject obtains either some or all of the permissions of its creator user. A subject is allowed to access a Hadoop service if its creator user has the permissions assigned to it by the security administrator.
Experiment and results
Aiming to validate the BDF access broker, we implement an OpenStack [60] based Hadoop cluster that is configured as one rack of five nodes using two different node types, as detailed in Table 3 . The bar chart in Figure 9 illustrates a performance comparison of the WebHDFS read operation in two use cases: the first without utilizing any security measurements (native WebHDFS access), and the second by employing the proposed BDF access broker architecture pattern. The prime motivation for this performance evaluation is to gain an understanding of how the performance will be impacted with respect to Knox and Ranger. Overall, it can be observed that the performance effect, i.e., the time needed to process different file sizes, seems to be minimal. A more specific study on performance degradation is eventually needed, but for this proof-of-concept, it is correct to state that the performance has not been significantly impacted.
To define the relationship between the basic WebHDFS configuration and secure WebHDFS configuration with the proposed broker, we compare the speeds of the two methods. We fitted two linear regression models (see Appendix A) that can be found in Table 4 and 5. In the first case, the slope is approximately 0.24, and 0.25 in the second. These results show that the time increases by only 1% for each MB using the secure approach. Figure 9 also shows the time needed to perform WebHDFS calls (read/write) over different data points (data chunks between 100 MB and 500 MB). A box and whisker chart in Figure 10 shows the distribution of data into quartiles, highlighting the mean and outliers. Our experiment shows the box and whisker plot medians, interquartile ranges, and ranges of the secure and non-secure approaches. This experiment aimed to identify covariates that could influence the length of time taken to perform a read/write call by using the box and whisker plots to allow visual comparison of the median and spread. Areas of potential interest are highlighted for future prospective work. The whiskers extend from the box to the highest and lowest values, and our experiment shows that no outliers exist. Also, Figure 11 , shows that the relationship between the two variables is positive linear.
Access Audit Log Management and Analysis
NN, as a data lake gateway, writes access audit log information to local files after each successful/failed access call. These access log files generally contain in- process that fuses different log files from various sources in a centralized repository to facilitate the analysis of the collected logs. This feature is disabled by default; by enabling it, the log files of different daemons will be allocated to a centralized directory (e.g., HDFS). However, even using this feature, the large amount of aggregated data in Hadoop federation architecture will lack governance requirements, like file tagging, labeling, and classification. It will be stressful for investigators to examine such pieces of information, and it can easily frustrate them.
The proposed access broker not only provides fine-grained access control but also a centralized auditing approach (see Figure 12 ). By employing the Ranger Audit Server, the BDF access broker will aggregate all access logs into a centralized repository (RDBMS, HDFS, or Log4j). The log aggregation service will regularly check the running tasks and start to aggregate and transfer the logs to a centralized repository (typically HDFS). Subsequently, access audit logs can be allocated by other digital forensics tools for any visualization or search tool for Consider the following scenario that illustrates how to investigate a security breach using the access audit logs by storing and analysing the access log data. • Loading log data: Utilizes Apache Flume [63] to stream large amounts of log data from the VPN server into the HDFS. The log records contain a timestamp, IP address, country, and indicator about whether the connection was successful or not.
• Refining log data: A storage management layer must be employed to enable a relational view of data without affecting the data format. This layer aids in browsing the log data (making sure it has been loaded correctly). Apache HCatalog, i.e., Hadoop catalogue, may be utilized to provide a metadata layer and rest interface for Hadoop data. Next, the admin needs to write them onto any data analytics framework for review (visualization tool). An Apache Pig script may be used to push the latest log data to the visualization tool. The forensic report and the process output data are used to update the firewall to deny requests from the unauthorized IP addresses. To automate this update, the admin can use Apache Ozzie to schedule a job to automatically update his firewall every hour. This report can also be used for other forensics to respond to different security threats, prepare for compliance audits, and prepare behavioural analytics (for security patching).
Summary and Future directions
Next-generation access control systems aim to become more scalable with even finer-grained authentication and authorization management [36] . However,
given the emerging trends of the distributed, heterogeneous, and federated infrastructure associated with Hadoop 3. x architectures, the need for a lightweight security framework is inevitable. In this paper, we present a BD Federation- Table   6 represents these limitations as threats and links them with solutions. Overall, the primary benefits of the BDF broker architectural pattern can be summarized in four different categories:
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Enhanced security: A method to ensure that data is stored securely in BDF and BDaaS clouds using a robust access control mechanism. This involves using (i) Knox to expose REST and HTTP services without revealing the details of the underlying Hadoop cluster, and (ii) Ranger for fine-grain authorization over federation NNs.
Centralized control: Using a single gateway with a distributed agent to prevent unauthorized access to the modern data lake. This also allows IT departments to set and enforce security policies regarding data usage, access calls, and resource utilization over secure channels.
Facilitated auditing and analysis:
A centralized repository for all access logs with a sophisticated governance and accountability approach (reporting and regulatory compliance). This approach enables threat prevention methods, e.g., behavioural analytics and threat intelligence. In particular, this includes policies that extend ABAC with stateful access sessions and mutable attributes (i.e., characteristics that dynamically 38 change during the session). This extension is invaluable to advance the authorization mechanisms of the multi-tenant data lake architecture, as well as the latest BDF model. Tackling this issue can be achieved by deploying policy templates that extend the primary ACL (or any access decision enforcer) as a specialization of the XACML V3.0 standard.
• Dynamic Access Control: More than ever, scalability and dynamicity of the BD deployment architecture in terms of user and node participation are vital for the secure delivery of security provisioning in a federation environment. There have been different adapted security mechanisms and techniques proposed to cope with this concern. However, more research activities are still needed to establish scalable security models and paradigms that must be driven by BD specifications and requirements. Also, new security abstractions for BDF are still needed to simplify the task of identifying the unimproved gaps. For instance, leveraging new mechanisms of policy enforcement [66] to combine BDF with ABAC [20] could be pursued in future research.
• Stateful Access Sessions: This requires restricting the BDF access to only those authorized by the succinct gateway. However, the current state-of-the-art BD-based encryption technologies involve transparent data encryption. Federation environments track the participation states and characteristics of the clients and networks traversing them with mutable attributes (i.e., the values of the attributes change over time during an access session). This operation requires formulating policy templates on top of standards such as XACML V3.0 for dynamic authorization with stateful access sessions. This takes place at the service level (e.g., data access calls) and does not protect data-in-transit or data-in-process (not even the metadata). Attribute-based encryption in conjunction with the usage control approach and ABAC can be labeled as a future direction for this issue.
Providing new solutions for all of these research directions will promote in-39 novative BDF solutions with advanced security features. It is also expected that adoption of the FACRM use cases will be implemented within our BD opportunistic and elastic resource allocation (OPERA) platform. OPERA architecture (prototype proposed in [68] ) combines the computing power of highthroughput resources available (non-dedicated) to the Hadoop 3 dedicated cluster using Docker containers as worker nodes. Those non-dedicated containers tend to be more vulnerable, which requires a robust IAM approach to minimize security threats.
